Protests across Morocco have emerged in response to the government's increasing diplomatic ties with Israel, with demonstrators calling for an end to normalization. The latest protests occurred on September 27, following a three-day campaign organized by the Moroccan Front for Supporting Palestine and Against Normalisation. This mobilization came after Morocco and Israel announced plans to elevate their diplomatic missions to full embassies and appoint ambassadors on September 16.
The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes reported organizing 76 events in 45 cities under the slogan “Friday for Al-Aqsa and against normalisation.” Protests were reported in cities including Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tangier, Fez, Agadir, Oujda, Tetouan, Kenitra, and Sale. However, the committee's count of events has not been independently verified.
In Rabat, protesters gathered outside Parliament, while a demonstration in Marrakesh turned into a march through main streets. Reports indicated that some protests faced restrictions, with local authorities in Tangier banning a planned demonstration on September 27, leading to the dispersal of participants and the detention of over 12 individuals. Similar restrictions were noted in M’diq, and security forces surrounded a gathering in Agadir to prevent it from escalating. The Moroccan Committee condemned these actions as bans and restrictions.
The protests reflect a disconnect between public sentiment and the government's diplomatic actions. Morocco restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2020 as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords, which included US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
On September 16, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar met in New York at a trilateral summit, confirming plans to elevate diplomatic missions and exchange ambassadors. Morocco and Israel also agreed on investment protection, avoiding double taxation, expanding direct flights, and organizing high-level reciprocal visits.
Opponents of normalization argue that the embassy agreement contradicts Morocco's public support for the Palestinian cause. A recent Arab Opinion Index indicated that 89 percent of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel, while only six percent support it. Activists emphasize that the Palestinian issue is integral to Morocco's political and moral responsibilities.
The September agreement has intensified existing tensions, as public mobilization against normalization persists alongside the government's efforts to strengthen ties with Israel. The timing of these developments is also significant for Morocco's Western Sahara policy, with the UN Security Council set to consider the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in October.
The September 16 trilateral statement coincided with US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israel's support for Morocco's position on the territory. For Rabat, the relationship with Israel is part of a broader foreign-policy strategy that includes ties with Washington and international backing for its stance on Western Sahara.
While the protests illustrate the ability of organizations opposed to normalization to mobilize, their impact on government policy remains uncertain. The PJD, which opposed normalization while in power, has reaffirmed its stance against relations with Israel after parliamentary elections on September 23, where it gained a larger presence but remains in opposition. The protests indicate ongoing public dissent, but whether this will translate into political pressure is unclear.