A senior Iraqi source has indicated that a resistance 'splinter' group may be responsible for the September attack on the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia. The drone strikes, which originated from Iraqi territory, threatened approximately 4 percent of global oil supplies and contributed to an increase in Brent crude prices, which rose above $108 a barrel. This incident presents Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi with a significant challenge in his commitment to bring armed groups under state control, especially as the US-led coalition prepares for its final withdrawal by September 30.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks that occurred last Thursday. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of pro-Iranian factions including Kataib Hezbollah, has denied involvement, stating that the strike is “an honour that we do not claim.” Baghdad has confirmed that the drones were launched from Iraqi soil, with security forces identifying launch traces near the Duwayrij River in Maysan province’s al-Tayeb border area on Saturday. Lieutenant General Saad Maan, head of Iraq’s Security Media Cell, reported that an intelligence task force had seized a launch platform.
A senior source at the Ministry of Interior informed Al Jazeera that they believe a resistance splinter group was responsible, although this has not been officially confirmed. If accurate, this points to a more significant issue of factions operating outside the state’s control, including subgroups that function independently within these factions.
Michael Knights, a research lead at the Washington-based consultancy Horizon Engage, expressed skepticism regarding the attribution of the attack, suggesting it may be a front for a cell operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or established armed factions. He noted that such tactics are often used to complicate government responses.
In response to international pressure, Prime Minister Zaidi has taken swift action, including the dismissal of the Maysan operations commander, the formation of an investigative committee, and the closure of several border crossings with Iran to prevent the escape of those responsible. He has also deployed heavily armed troops in Maysan.
However, many observers view these actions as insufficient to satisfy Saudi and US demands for accountability, especially since this attack is not the first to originate from Iraqi territory. In July, drones launched from Iraq targeted Saudi oil facilities, allegedly with assistance from Houthi fighters based in Iraq. The US and Saudi Arabia retaliated, resulting in the deaths of over 20 members of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), including Iranian military advisers, which led to diplomatic tensions and the postponement of a planned trip to Riyadh by al-Zaidi.
The ongoing violence poses a risk to the improving relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which had been strained since Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Diplomatic ties began to thaw in the mid-2010s as both nations faced the rise of ISIL, with border crossings reopening in 2020 and discussions of investment and infrastructure links emerging. Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan visited Baghdad this month, and Riyadh has refrained from retaliating against the September 10 attack at Zaidi’s request.
Lahib Higel, deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, suggested that the drone strike may have been intended as a warning to al-Zaidi, who is seeking to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia as part of a broader strategy to diversify Iraq’s economy. Some factions may view al-Zaidi’s engagement with Saudi Arabia as a threat, prioritizing revenge for fighters killed in Saudi strikes over economic cooperation. Iran and its affiliated factions may also oppose any efforts to reduce Iraq’s economic dependence on Tehran or to establish alternative oil export routes.
Zaidi has attempted to navigate these complex relationships, hosting Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in August shortly after visiting Tehran for discussions with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Despite being seen as a compromise candidate within the governing Shia bloc and a preferred option for the US, Zaidi faces significant pressure.
His intentions are clear; he has directed Iraqi banks to enforce US sanctions on Lebanon’s Hezbollah, requested parliament to draft legislation to place weapons under state control, and stated that individuals who refuse to disarm will face treason charges. However, enforcement has proven challenging. In July, troops attempting to search a compound belonging to Harakat al-Nujaba were met with warning shots, and a senior Nujaba intelligence official was released shortly after his arrest.
Nevertheless, a Baghdad court sentenced a member of Kataib Hezbollah to 15 years in prison for the March kidnapping of US journalist Shelly Kittleson. Higel noted that while Zaidi has taken bolder actions than previous prime ministers, such verdicts do not significantly alter the overall situation, as the system remains unchanged.
Three factions—Kataib Hezbollah, Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada—continue to refuse disarmament, and few analysts believe that substantial concessions will be made. The Iraqi state has shown little willingness to confront pro-Iranian factions. Knights emphasized that the ability of the state to act is less about military strength and more about political will, suggesting that the recent attack on Saudi Arabia was likely intended to draw US attention back to the faction leaders.
He remarked that the audacity of the armed factions indicates a lack of fear regarding potential repercussions. Knights believes that Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) possesses the capability to eliminate the leaders of most armed factions if it had the backing of Iraq’s leadership, Washington, and Gulf allies. However, there is skepticism among officials regarding the likelihood of US support in times of crisis, particularly given the lack of response to Saudi Arabia’s requests for assistance against the Houthis in Yemen.
Higel concluded that the factions perceive time as an ally and may be willing to wait out the current US administration. Al-Zaidi’s challenge may be to appear assertive enough to satisfy Washington and Riyadh without provoking a backlash that could threaten his government, with the potential for violence against political leaders remaining a concern.